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Abstract 
 
The paper accounts for the veto player system that dominates the decisions on the medium-term 
expenditure ceilings (the Financial Perspectives) and on the revenues (the Own Resources Decision) 
and for the joint decision-making mode that has been gradually introduced for the European 
Union’s annual budgetary process. This two-tier system has been confirmed by the new 
Constitutional Treaty, which does not substantially innovate the intergovernmental procedures 
governing the medium term programming and financing. With respect to the annual budgetary 
process, the Constitutional Treaty institutionalises the rules which have been necessitated by 
practical constraints outside the Treaty machinery: the new process is modelled on a modified 
version of legislative Codecision and provides for incentives to the parties to agree on the budget 
draft decided by the Conciliation Committee. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) budget represents has a modest size with respect to the national budgets 
and with respect to the pervasive role of the Union’s policies and interventions: 112 billions in 
2006, nearly 1,01% of the enlarged EU GNI. However, the decision making process for the EU 
finances presents a rather complex system: financial decisions are taken by different authorities, are 
adopted through very different procedures and give rise to acts belonging to different categories. 
Seen in its historical perspective, it is also an illuminating example of the intertwining of super-
national and intergovernmental elements that is so specific of the EU processes. 
 The Rome Treaty entrusted the competence over the Union’s finances to the member States, 
both for the expenditure and for the revenue side. This inter-governmental practice benefited from a 
qualified majority voting rule which allowed the regular approval of the budget during the ‘60s and 
avoided the problems that the ordinary legislation met because of the application of the 
Luxembourg compromise. The procedure was modified in the ‘70s by the introduction of super-
national elements in the form of the upgrading of the European Parliament’s role: this represented 
the first substantial involvement of the Parliament in the Union’s decision making process, a sort of 
test bed for its subsequent assignment of competencies in the legislative field.   
The EU finances are currently decided by a mixture of inter-governmental and super-national 
decision making practices. The power over the annual budget is shared by the two budgetary 
authorities, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The budget is however framed 
by a medium-term financial programming decided at intergovernmental level. The setting of the 
revenues, the way they are calculated and the ceilings on the expenditures depend on a two-tier veto 
player decision making system:  
2. the Own Resources Decision, taken unanimously by Council of Ministers;  
3. the Financial Perspectives, decided unanimously by the European Council.  
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A super-national element is inserted in the decision on the Financial Perspectives, as they must be 
adopted by means of an Interinstitutional Agreement which is jointly approved by the Commission, 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
 The aim of the paper is to analyse the intertwining of super-national elements in the 
originally inter-governmental decision making structure for the EU finances, focussing on its effects 
on the strategic properties of the procedures, on the formal institutional interactions and on what the 
European institutions can do on the basis of their rules. The paper leaves aside the issues of the 
preferences of the actors, of coalition formation and of the voting rules. Searching for the insertion 
of super-national elements, particular attention will be devoted to the reform of the procedures for 
the EU finances introduced by the Constitutional text. Although it is not sure that the Constitution 
will be definitely approved, as it has been rejected in the French and Dutch referenda, however, it 
provides for a thorough rationalization of the procedures: legislative codecision has become the 
reference model for super-national decision making and also the budgetary procedure has been 
tuned to it. The Constitutional reform however implies the institutionalization of the negotiation 
fora (interinstitutional agreements, trialogues, conciliation meetings,…) which currently support the 
budgetary process and which have proved so useful in sustaining repeated interactions among the 
budgetary institutions and in channelling inter-institutional conflict into cooperation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the procedures for 
the EU finances which are based on a veto players system, i.e. the Financial Perspectives and the 
Own Resources Decision, presenting also the changes introduced by the new Constitutional Treaty. 
Section 3 analyses the super-national elements which are present in the EU finances decision-
making process, notably the Interinstitutional Agreement and the annual budget. Section 4 analyses 
the process leading to a revised version of the budgetary procedure in the new Constitution. Section 
5 resumes the main findings.  
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2. The veto player framework  
A strong intergovernmental element is embedded in the EU finances decision-making process, as 
the main framing decisions on revenues (the Own Resources decision) and expenditures (the 
Financial Perspectives) are set by the EU institutions which voice the member States’ interests, 
namely the European Council and the Council of Ministers. 
 
2.1 The negotiation on the expenditures: the Financial Perspectives  
In the Financial Perspectives, an overall ceiling on the own resources, expressed as a percentage of 
the EU GNI, limits the size of the annual budget. Leaving a margin for unforeseen contingencies 
under the own resources ceiling, the Financial Perspectives set for each year the budget total 
payment appropriations and the commitment appropriations for each line of expenditure: revenues 
automatically adapt to the expenditures, given the EU balanced budget requirement.  
The Financial Perspectives were first introduced by Jacques Delors in 1987/88, as a means to 
reduce the conflicts between the EU budgetary authorities and to provide for sufficient resources to 
implement the policies decided in the Single European Act: they represented “a move from 
bargaining to authority, from budgetary chaos to order” (Laffan, 2000, p.733). The Financial 
Perspectives combine institutional and distributive issues (Lindner, 2006), establish political 
priorities and concentrate the budgetary conflicts at the time of their renewal. By establishing the 
Financial Perspectives, the European Council curtails the flexibility of the annual procedure and 
prevents major shifts between the main spending blocs: the European Parliament and Council of 
Ministers are left the manoeuvre only within the fixed ceilings of expenditures when deciding the 
annual budget.  Thus, the Financial Perspectives “limit the scope for supranational decision-taking 
in the annual budgetary procedure” (Enderlein et al., 2005, p.16). 
The decision on the Financial Perspectives is based on intergovernmental negotiation among 
the Member States. Although the Commission prepares the first draft, it is not the agenda-setter: it 
has not significant control over the outcomes of the process, as the European Council decides as a 
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sovereign body and can radically change the overall budget and the lines of expenditure proposed 
by the Commission. In December 2005, at the end of the negotiations for the 2007-2013 Financial 
Perspectives, the European Council agreed on a budget of 862.3 billion euro, 273 billion euro less 
than the original proposal from the Commission in 2004. 
However, the Commission can decisively orientate the European Council’s decision, as it is 
assigned the role of preparing the focal points for discussion and bargaining and to act as a mediator 
in the negotiations. In the last renewals of the Financial Perspectives, this mediating role has been 
increasingly taken by the European Council Presidency, while the Commission has been left the 
task of framing the negotiations (Laffan, 2000).  
The European Council decides by unanimous consensus of its members and no final nor 
formal voting is explicitly foreseen, although in recent years it has been increasingly used, given 
some member States’ intransigence on controversial issues. The request for unanimity gives each 
country a veto power, i.e. “a property right in the status quo” (Klick and Parisi, 2003, p. 87) and, in 
presence of side payments and transaction costs, it allows for significant strategic behaviour: 
member States can falsify their preferences and indulge in opposition to make pressure on the other 
States, to gain side-payments or simply to keep the situation unchanged. The negotiation on the 
Financial Perspectives has repeatedly provided the member States with such opportunities for 
strategic hold-up, especially in presence of diametrically opposed interests (for example, the 'net 
contributors’ club’ vs. the net beneficiary countries) and has displayed a strong status quo bias, as 
demonstrated by the difficult and prolonged discussions.  
However, other elements counterbalance the status quo bias: 
i. increases in the amount of side payments that spur ‘integrative negotiations’ (Laffan, 2000). 
Side payments can be provided by one or more member States increasing their contribution 
to the EU budget or reducing their share in the EU expenditures to move negotiations on 
from political impasses. In the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives negotiations, this role was 
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played by UK, which accepted to cut its rebate by 10,5 billion euro over the seven-year 
period1. 
ii. vote and position trading, which is possible given the multi-annual dimension of the 
Financial Perspectives. Vote trading makes veto power ineffective: in exchange for the 
promise that their preferences will be decisive in the future on another issue, players may 
accept an outcome that they do not prefer over the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002). This explains 
why “new policies are adopted that, in themselves, are known by all observers to be disliked 
by many if not most of the member states who, nonetheless, unanimously give their assent 
to them” (Salmon, 2003, p.13). Also the impossibility to reach an agreement can often be 
explained by the too high prices some States would have to pay to make their proposal be 
approved by the other member States. 
iii. the multi-dimensionality of issues of the Financial Perspectives where budgetary and non-
budgetary issues are dealt in conjunction. The higher the dimensionality of the issue space, 
the higher the possibilities to depart from the status quo and the less it matters the number of 
veto players and the unanimity requirement  (Selck, 2006). The importance of this ‘grand 
bargain’ (Laffan, 2000) dimension was originally intuited by J.Delors: “au lieu de discuter 
séparément de tel ou tel sujet, il fallai faire un compromis général qui ferai la part du pour et 
du contre dans l’ensemble de ce qui était sur la table” (Delors, 2004, p. 246). 
The strain between the status quo bias and all the above integrative elements explains the gradual 
and modest increases in the EU budget since the introduction of the financial programming: the 
own resources ceiling has increased from 1,15 % EU GNP in 1988 to 1,27% in 2006, while the total 
appropriations for payments have changed from 1,08 % to 1,12% EU GNP in the same period. 
                                                          
1 To the provision for side payments to support progress in integration are now commonly ascribed the main failures of 
the EU budget, which is considered by many scholars an inappropriate tool for fostering common goals (Gros and 
Micossi, 2005; Buti and Nava, 2003), unable to expand the provision of public goods in new areas of integration, such 
as internal and external security or foreign policy (Tabellini, 2003). 
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2.2  The medium-term financial programming in the new Constitution 
Since its opening, the Convention discussed the role of the Multiannual Financial Framework, as 
the Financial Perspectives were renamed: there was broad consensus on the idea of formally 
establishing them in the Constitution as a binding framework for the annual budget, no longer based 
only on voluntary cooperation among member States and EU institutions. However, the Convention 
was deeply divided over the adoption procedure: “while some members proposed the adoption by 
the Council following consultation of the European Parliament, others wanted to apply the 
legislative procedure or ad hoc procedures for joint adoption by the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers” (European Convention, 2003a). The European Parliament and the 
Commission advocated the Parliament’s role as a co-legislator, suggesting the introduction of a 
Codecision procedure, either budgetary Codecision (European Parliament 2003, §. 10) or 
Codecision for legislative acts (European Parliament, 2002, §.6). Both would have implied 
substituting for the current veto player system and introducing super-national decision making 
modes. 
The IX Working Group and the Discussion Circle on the budgetary procedure (European 
Convention, 2003b) agreed instead on a solution not distant from the current procedure. The final 
draft presented by the Convention (art. I-54, European Convention 2003c) transferred the decision-
making power from the European Council to the Council of Ministers deciding by qualified 
majority voting2, after obtaining the consent of Parliament, given by a majority of its component 
members. Enderlein et al. (2005) argue that this downgrading of the political decision level could 
undermine the character of the Financial Perspectives as a negotiating device, a multi-dimensional 
policy space where both budgetary and non-budgetary issues are dealt together. 
The Convention’s draft did not meet the favour of the all member States in the 
Intergovernmental Conference and an even more conservative solution prevailed in the 
                                                          
2 The voting procedure was not specified, but § 4 of article I-54 (European Convention, 2003c) provides that the first 
Financial Perspectives after the Constitution is signed should be adopted by the Council of Ministers by unanimity: the 
logical consequence seems to be that qualified majority voting should be the normal procedure. 
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Constitution’s final text: it states that the Financial Perspectives have the status of a European law 
of the Council of Ministers and require unanimous approval (art. I-34 §. 2, Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution, 2004). This institutionalises the dominant role of the Council of Ministers acting in a 
system of veto players: the provision for a passerelle towards qualified majority voting by no means 
implies that it should be employed, given that the use of this bridging clause is made difficult by the 
Constitutional provision (art. IV-444, Treaty Establishing a Constitution, 2004) granting veto power 
to national Parliaments. 
The request of the European Parliament’s consent voted by a majority of its members would 
seem to introduce a sort of veto power for the Parliament. However, this should not effectively 
impinge on the Council’s supremacy: previous historical experience in the negotiations on the 
Interinstitutional Agreement (see ultra § 3.1) shows that the Parliament has always used its veto 
power only to indulge in opposition and to extract concessions. Finally, the Constitution provides 
no solution for the cases of conflict between the Council and the Parliament. 
 
2.3.  The negotiation on the revenues: The Own Resources Decision 
The nature of the revenues and the way they are calculated are set by the Own Resources system3, 
introduced by the Luxembourg European Council (1970) to replace the direct contributions from 
the member States. The decision-making process (art. 269 TEC) is tune according to strict 
intergovernmental modes: the Commission’s proposal on the Own Resources is adopted 
unanimously by the Council of Ministers after consulting the European Parliament; then, the 
Council recommends that the member States ratify it, like any international agreement entailing 
consequences for the national finances.  
This procedure gives the whole decision-making power to the Council: the Commission, 
which submits the draft, is not the agenda-setter, as it has no control over the process and the 
                                                          
3 The system is currently based on the Council of Ministers’decision (2000/597/EC), as amended by Regulation 
2028/2004, and on two implementing regulations (n.1287/2003 and n.1553/89). 
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outcome. The draft is voted by Council at unanimity both to approve and to amend it. The 
Parliament must be consulted, but its opinion is not binding.  
The request for unanimity in the Council creates a veto players system, where the number of 
the actors and the difference in their preferences determine the policy stability of the status quo and 
the alternatives that can defeat it (Tsebelis, 2002). This system gives “all the decision-making 
power to the government with the least interest in changing the status quo [and it inserts] a powerful 
lowest common denominator bias in the Council deliberations ..... determined by the preferences of 
the least integrationist member government” (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996, p.281). Indeed, the Own 
Resources system has produced relatively stable distribution of the member States’ contributions to 
the EU budget since the introduction of the GNP resource in 1988: adjustments of the VAT 
resource regime, of the UK rebate and of its financing have not entailed major changes in the 
sharing of the budgetary costs (Kauppi and Widgrén, 2004).  
The Convention was seen as the occasion to rethink also the Own Resources system. 
However, discussions on the adoption procedure ended early, as the decision on the financial 
resources of the Union impinges on the national Parliaments’ taxation powers: both the 
Convention’s draft and the Constitution confirm the current system of veto players (art.I-54, Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution, 2004): the European Law of Council of Ministers that will set the Own 
Resources will require unanimous consensus and no passerelle for the introduction of qualified 
majority voting is provided for; the Commission is not upgraded to an agenda-setter role and the 
Parliament’s role is limited just to consultation. 
 
3. The insertion of joint decision-making modes 
The shift from the strict intergovernmental framework towards joint decision making modes began 
in the ’70 with the reform of the budgetary procedure. The next step was the provision that the 
Financial Perspectives negotiated by the European Council should be jointly adopted by the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 
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3.1 The Interinstitutional Agreement 
The Financial Perspectives are a “political decision” which is somehow binding for the other 
European institutions: after the European Council’s approval, they are jointly negotiated and 
adopted by the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament by means of an 
Interinstitutional Agreement on the budgetary discipline. The nature of the Interinstitutional 
Agreement is that of “a gentlemen’s agreement”, a contractual instrument not mentioned in the 
Treaties, which do not recognise it any legal effect4. It does not change the distribution of 
competencies assigned by the Treaties, but it has far reaching consequences on the freedom of 
action of the subscribing institutions which cannot unilaterally modify them. As any commitment 
device, the Interinstitutional Agreement ties the hands of the institutions which sign it: the Council 
of Ministers accepts to control the agricultural expenditure, which is its privilege as a compulsory 
expenditure; the European Parliament limits itself when voting amendments to the non-compulsory 
expenditures; the Commission has reduced scope in preparing the preliminary draft budget.  
In negotiating the Interinstitutional Agreement, each one of the three institutions act as a 
collective veto player (Tsebelis, 2002), as each one’s consent is necessary to change the status quo. 
The different voting rules also play a role in the inter-institutional bargain: the Commission 
endorses the decision by simple majority and the European Parliament votes a resolution also by 
simple majority5. As the Council must implement the political decision on the Financial 
Perspectives taken by the European Council, it endorses it by a vote under unanimity, which means 
that there can be abstentions but no vote against. Thus, in principle, it should be much easier to gain 
a majority in the Parliament and in the Commission, than to gain a unanimous vote in the Council: 
an Interinstitutional Agreement that receive the unanimous vote of the Council is very likely to 
                                                          
4 The Court of Justice never pronounced itself on the judiciary value of the Interinstitutional Agreement, but 
acknowledged their utility, as they are based on the principle of loyal co-operation among institutions which the 
Treaties promote. 
5 The Parliament’s legal service concluded in 1999 that the requested majority was simple majority (art. 198 TEC), 
although some Members of the Parliament asked for qualified majority decisions, given the nature of certain provisions 
included in the Interinstitutional Agreement. 
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attract the majority of votes in the Parliament and in the Commission. This would make the Council 
the critical player in the game: however, as the Council is the expression of the Member States and 
duplicates their preferences, its unanimous consensus to the Interinstitutional Agreement can be 
taken for granted after the European Council decision.  
On the contrary, the Parliament has always shown dissatisfaction with the European Council’s 
proposals and has repeatedly menaced to veto the Interinstitutional Agreement, mainly on grounds 
of its providing for insufficient resources. However, the Parliament’s threat of not signing the 
Interinstitutional Agreement was not credible and was disregarded when the Financial Perspectives 
ceilings lay significantly above what could be obtained by the application of the Treaty’s provisions 
on the budget (Lindner, 2006). Also when the Financial Perspectives ceilings have been close or 
beneath to what was obtainable by the ordinary provisions of the Treaty6, the Parliament’s 
opposition did not prove that strong, given the simple majority requirement and the Council of 
Ministers’ granting of concessions, either improvements and benefits from the institutional side of 
the budget (opinion exchanges on the financial priorities, concert on compulsory expenditures) or 
small increases in the budget7. 
The Interinstitutional Agreement will disappear in the Constitution’s new provisions for the 
adoption of the Financial Perspectives: this will eliminate a forum for negotiation and a conflict-
reducing device. This tendency towards the institutionalization of contractual instruments, which 
have voluntary nature, will probably increase “the tendency for negotiations over a new Financial 
Perspective to confirm the existing spending structure. Budgetary actors could simply prevent 
                                                          
6 The Parliament estimates that, had it used the instrument it is entitled to by the Treaties, the Maximum Rate of 
Increase of the non compulsory expenditures, it could have increased the budget by nearly 33 billion over the 2000-
2004 period (European Parliament, 2004). 
7 In the negotiation for the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives, the Parliament initially rejected the European Council 
conclusion on grounds of its prevailing over the Parliament’s powers and of its providing for insufficient resources: the 
Parliament asked for at least a 12 billion increase in the budget  (European Parliament resolution, 18 January 2006). On 
April 2006 the negotiations for the signing of the Interinstitutional Agreement ended with a final increase in the budget 
by 4 billion euro. 
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change by relying on the automatic prolongation of the status quo. Also the threat to exit the 
Financial Perspective or to veto its renewal has so far served as a healthy warning to all actors 
involved, thereby forcing them to cooperate” (Enderlein et al., 2005, p.18). 
 
3.2 The annual budgetary procedure 
Article 203 of the Rome Treaty gave the first rules for the budgetary procedure: the draft budget 
presented by the Commission was to be discussed, modified and approved by the Council voting by 
qualified majority. Within a month, the Parliament either approved the budget or did not react to it 
(in both cases the budget was approved) or amended it: in this latter case, the Council deliberated on 
each amendment by qualified majority. This procedure left the Council the primary role in the 
budgetary decisions: in fact, the Council could modify the Commission’s draft by qualified majority 
voting and unanimity was not required even when the Council discussed and approved the 
Parliament’s amendments.   
This procedure was different from the ordinary procedure for legislation, consultation (Art. 
250 TEC): the preliminary budget draft prepared by the Commission was not considered a 
legislative proposal, but a sui generis act which disappeared when the Council adopted the budget 
draft. Thus the Commission’s right did not correspond to an effective agenda-setting power. The 
procedure worked quite well until 1970 and the budget was always regularly approved. The request 
for qualified majority voting in the Council avoided the problems that ordinary legislation met 
during those same years because of the application of the Luxembourg compromise.   
The Luxembourg Treaty (1970) and the Bruxelles Treaty (1975) modified the original 
procedure, upgrading the power of Parliament, while not improving the agenda-setter role of the 
Commission. The empowerment of Parliament was meant to strengthen the democratic legitimacy 
of the Community8:  the Parliament’s involvement in the budgetary decisions was the first step, as it 
                                                          
8 The Parliament’s involvement in the budgetary process coincided with a major advance in the Community’s 
integration process spurred by the Aja Conference (December 1969) and by France President G. Pompidou’ s 
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preceded both the decision to elect Parliamentarians by universal direct voting in 1976 and the 
upgrading of its legislative power by the Single European Act  in 1987. 
The first power assigned to the Parliament by the Luxembourg Treaty was on the 
expenditures, divided into two groups: the compulsory expenditures (CE)9, which the Parliament 
can modify, while the Council retains the final say on them; the non-compulsory expenditures 
(NCE), which the Parliament can amend and over which it keeps the final say. The Parliament’s 
modifications to the compulsory expenditures were divided again into two types: those that increase 
total expenditure and those that do not increase it. The first ones must be approved by the Council 
by qualified majority, otherwise they decay; the second ones can be refused by the Council by 
qualified majority, otherwise they are approved. 
The Luxembourg Treaty stated that the non compulsory expenditures must be limited by a 
Maximum Rate of Increase (MRI), a statistical indicator ascertained by the Commission. A higher 
Maximum Rate of Increase can be decided by the Council and the Parliament when required by the 
Community’s activities: this decision often caused conflicts, as the Parliament asked to exceed the 
Rate to “promote its policy preferences [..... and] to expand policies falling under the non-
compulsory heading so that it had the final say over a larger part of the budget” (Laffan, 1997: 83-
84). The Bruxelles Treaty further expanded the Parliament’s power and the reasons for conflict by 
granting it a ‘margin for manoeuvre’, i.e. a sum on whose destination the Parliament can freely 
decide and which it can use to increase the non compulsory expenditures or to create new 
expenditures.  
The delegation of budgetary powers to the Parliament does not correspond to standard 
principal-agent models, as the Parliament enjoys significant autonomy with respect to the member 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
commitment to solve all the institutional quarrels that had caused a stalemate of the Community’s activities since the 
1965 crisis. On the link between transfers of sovereignty and the exacerbation of the legitimacy deficit in the EU, see 
Auel and Rittberger (2006).  
9 The compulsory expenditures are the expenditures “necessarily resulting from the Treaties or from acts adopted in 
accordance therewith” (art. 272 TEC). 
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States (Pollack, 1997). Its independence and the absence of rules in the Treaty to solve disputes 
between the budgetary authorities10 led to annual conflicts on the division of the budgetary powers 
for nearly a decade. After the introduction of the Financial Perspectives, however, the annual 
budget has been approved without major obstacles. One of the main causes of conflict, the 
Maximum Rate of Increase, was in fact neutralized, as the annual increases in the non compulsory 
expenditures decided by the Parliament are subject to the ceilings of the medium-term 
programming: as already noted, this implicitly modifies the Treaties’ provisions on the sharing of 
budgetary powers.  
Besides, the 1988, 1993 and 1999 Interinstitutional Agreements increased the recourse to 
negotiation to solve conflicts outside the formal structure of the annual budget cycle: four trialogues 
and two conciliation meetings11 now punctuate the procedure, which is described in Article 272 
TEC and illustrated in the Appendix - Figure 1. The extensive use of negotiation has made the 
distinction between compulsory and non compulsory expenditures less relevant and has extended 
the power of the Parliament over the whole budget (Enderlein et al., 2005). 
Negotiation is essential to avoid inter-institutional conflicts, as the procedure designed by the 
Treaty encourages inter-institutional opposition. The strategy “amend” would be in principle 
preferable for both the Parliament and the Council to retain power over the expenditures assigned to 
them. Items of expenditure which are not amended at the first readings, cannot later be modified; 
besides, whenever the Council and the Parliament reach an agreement over an item, there may no be 
subsequent changes. Thus, if the Parliament accepts the Council’s decision on the compulsory 
expenditures at its first reading, the Council cannot return to it on its second reading; if the 
Parliament accepts an item of non compulsory expenditures entered in the draft budget at its first 
                                                          
10 The absence of detailed institutional arrangements, which limit the scope for interpretation, can be ascribed to  the 
presence of conflicting polity ideas among the member States, which “will be less able to specify the details of the rules 
governing future interaction among the execution coalition. As a result, the potential for rule interpretation is likely to 
increase” (Lindner and Rittberger, 2003, p.451).  
11 Trialogues are attended by the Chairman of the Parliament  Committee on Budgets, the President of Council of 
Ministers  (Budgets) and the Commissioner for the budget. Conciliation meetings are attended by the members of 
Council  (Budgets) and a Parliament’s delegation, while the Commission acts as mediator. 
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reading, neither it nor the Council can return to it in the second readings. Inaction on the part of one 
authority implies the approval of the draft budget in the version approved at the previous reading by 
the other authority. 
Agenda-setting power is given to the Council on the compulsory expenditures, as their 
modification by the Parliament increasing the total expenditure must be approved by the Council at 
qualified majority voting during its second reading, otherwise the Council’s position holds in the 
final text. On the contrary, the Council votes on the Parliament’s modifications to the compulsory 
expenditures that do not increase the total expenditure and on the Parliament’s amendments to non 
compulsory expenditures only if it wants to reject them: as rejection at qualified majority voting 
implied 62 votes out of 87 in the EU-15, it has always been more difficult for the Council to reject 
than to accept the Parliament’s amendments/modifications. The Parliament has an agenda-setting 
power on these expenditures, although a weaker one than if the Council’s unanimity were required. 
  
4. The reform of the annual budgetary procedure in the Constitutional debate 
4.1 The Convention’s proposal                          
The current budget procedure has always been criticised for being too long and complicated: its 
reform was included among the goals of the Convention. The first suggestions came from its 
Working Group IX: “the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers shall on a proposal 
from the Commission [...] jointly adopt the Union’s budget” (Art. 40, European Convention, 2002). 
The “jointly adoption” implies the rejection of the distinction between compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditures and the extension of Parliament’s influence over the whole budget. The 
same view was shared by Parliament (European Parliament, 2003) and by the Commission 
(European Commission, 2002). The Parliament suggested that, in case of disagreement, the Council 
would retain the final word on the revenues, while the Parliament would retain the final word on the 
expenditures within the limits set by Council’s decision on the own resources. 
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The proposal was submitted to the Convention (European Convention, 2003a) and was 
redrafted twice by the Presidency. The Circle on the budgetary procedure suggested the introduction 
of a simpler procedure and the “consolidation of the rules which have been necessitated by practical 
constraints outside the Treaty machinery” (European Convention, 2003b, p.12). 
The final draft (Art. I-55, European Convention, 2003c) drops the ‘jointly adoption’ and 
provides in article III-310 for a complete description of the procedure (Appendix - Figure 2), 
modelling it on Amsterdam legislative Codecision, with some reminiscences also of the previous 
Maastricht version12. In the Convention’s proposal, the number of readings is reduced to one plus 
conciliation. The main difference with respect to Amsterdam Codecision is that, if the Conciliation 
Committee does not reach an agreement or if only the Council rejects the joint draft, the procedure 
does not end but continues, like in the Maastricht version. However, differently from Maastricht 
Codecision, the draft is passed not to the Council, but to the Parliament for a final decision: the 
Parliament thus becomes the agenda-setter and may confirm its amendments by a majority of its 
members and three fifths of the votes cast. The Council has no veto power on the Parliament’s 
decision.  
                                                          
12 The first version of Codecision was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (ex art. 189 b). The main novelties were the 
introduction of a third reading and of a Conciliation Committee, composed of an equal number of members of the 
Parliament and of the Council, while the Commission acts as a mediator. If the Council in its second reading disagrees 
with even a single amendment made by Parliament, the draft bill is referred to the Conciliation Committee. If the 
Committee reaches an agreement, its proposal has to be finally approved by the Parliament (by majority voting) and by 
the Council (by qualified majority voting). If the Conciliation Committee does not reaches an agreement, the procedure 
provides for a third reading by the Council, which can revert to its previous common position  (i.e. the text approved by 
the Council before the conciliation procedure, possibly with amendments proposed by the Parliament). The Parliament 
can only reject the Council’s proposal by absolute majority, otherwise it is adopted: at this stage the Council is the 
agenda-setter, making a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the Parliament. The asymmetry between the Council and the 
Parliament in Maastricht Codecision was later modified by the Amsterdam Treaty, as the Parliament disliked the fact 
that a disagreement in the Conciliation Committee did not imply the rejection of the draft bill, but passed it again to the 
Council. In Amsterdam Codecision (Art. 251 TEC), if the Conciliation Committee does not reach an agreement the bill 
is definitely rejected. Therefore, the text agreed on in the Conciliation Committee is established as the actual game 
equilibrium (Hix, 2002).  
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In summary, the hybrid version of codecision proposed by the Convention increases the 
power of the Parliament in the budgetary procedure, as it gives it the last word in case negotiation in 
the Conciliation Committee fails, with no possibility for the Council to veto the proposal. The 
procedure combines a joint decision mode (the Conciliation Committee) and a clear allocation of 
power resources (final word to the Parliament, no veto power to the Council in the last stage).  
 
4.2  The debate in the Intergovernmental Conference  
The Convention’s proposal for the budgetary procedure raised conflicts among the member States 
because of the Parliament’s increased power13. During the first months, the Italian Presidency of the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) acknowledged to be unable to reach consensus over an 
alternative. Slight modifications to the Convention text crept in only in December 2003, in the 
Presidency proposals for the Brussels European Council, starting the process of progressive 
limitation of the Parliament’s powers by including, in the final stage, a veto power to the Council on 
the Parliament’s amended text.  
As the European Council failed to reach an overall agreement, a thorough revision of the 
procedure was accomplished by the Irish Presidency, providing for a detailed account of the cases 
in which one or both budgetary institutions fail to take a decision or reject the joint text approved by 
the Conciliation Committee (IGC 73/04) and confirming the veto power to the Council. 
Dissatisfaction on the part of  some member States and of the Parliament forced the Irish Presidency 
to work out another version at the end of May 2004. The new version (IGC 78/04) rebalances the 
power of both institutions, granting the Parliament the possibility to confirm its amendments only in 
case the Council rejects the joint text and depriving the Council of its final veto power.   
                                                          
13 With respect to the budgetary procedure, the ECOFIN at Stresa (September 2003) asked that, “where the Conciliation 
Committee does not approve a joint text, or if the Council rejects the joint text, a budget shall be adopted, providing, in 
the case of each budget item which is subject to disagreement, the lowest amount proposed either by the Council or by 
the Parliament or, where it is higher, the figure in the budget law for the previous year” (IGC 37/03). The Italian 
Presidency decided not to adopt these proposals, which had triggered a wave of protests from the Parliament. 
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This last proposal was included in the 2004 final version of the Constitution (now art. III-403, 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution, 2004). The budgetary procedure (Appendix - Figure 3)  presents 
the new budgetary procedure, which now strictly resembles Amsterdam Codecision14. Thus, if the 
Conciliation Committee does not reach an agreement, the budget draft is rejected and the 
Commission prepares a new draft. However, some difference remains: 1) the Parliament may 
confirm its amendments if, during the vote on the joint text, the Council rejects it while the 
Parliament approves it.  2) The new procedure provides for a detailed specification of the moves for 
the Parliament and the Council deciding on the joint text. 
 
4.3  Comments on the budgetary process in the new Constitution 
The Constitution’s budgetary procedure does not radically innovate with respect to the current one. 
The adoption of Codecision formalises already robust practices of cooperation among the 
institutions: a formal Conciliation Committee substitutes for the current trialogues and conciliation 
meetings. One formal change has been the assignment to the Commission of the task of preparing 
not a “preliminary draft”, but the definitive “budget draft”, which the Commission can amend up to 
the conciliation stage: however, this does not upgrade the Commission to a real agenda-setter’s role.  
Besides, changes have been made to further tune the procedure to a joint decision mode: the 
IGC Irish Presidency strove to design “an approach which would strongly encourage and facilitate 
the achievement of agreement in the Conciliation Committee” (IGC 75/04). The incentives for the 
budgetary institutions to reach an agreement in the conciliation stage can be found in:  
1. the elimination of the possibility for the Parliament to confirm its amendments, if the 
Conciliation Committee does not reach an agreement. This increases the Parliament’s 
commitment to an agreement in the Conciliation Committee. Had the IGC not done so, 
                                                          
14 Codecision has been included in the Constitution as the ordinary legislative procedure for the European laws. Article 
III-396 of the Constitution reproduces art. 251 of the Treaties with some minor changes: for example, the Parliament’s 
first opinion is called a first reading; the Council’s decision  is simply called its “position”. 
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Council would have probably behaved as the Parliament did in the ‘90s to obtain the 
modification of Maastricht Codecision: it would have committed to always veto the 
Parliament’s text, thus forcing a change in the procedure; 
2. the set of strategies and outcomes for the Council and the Parliament when they decide on 
the Conciliation Committee’s joint text, as Table 1 shows: as the joint text is submitted en 
bloc to both institutions, the situation can be assimilated to a simultaneous moves one-shot 
game. The combination of strategies “adopt-adopt”, “not decide-not decide” or “adopt-not 
decide” leads to the approval of the joint text. Rejection, combined with any of the other 
strategies, leads to a new draft budget, except when the Parliament approves the joint text 
and the Council rejects it. This entails a punishment for the Council, as the Parliament can 
confirm its amendments unconditionally and the Council has no remedy for this. No 
punishment is provided for the Parliament. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Strategies for Council of Ministers (CM) and European Parliament (EP) after the 
Conciliation Committee 
 
 CM approves the 
joint text 
CM does not 
decide 
CM rejects the joint text 
EP approves the 
joint text 
Joint text adopted  Joint text adopted  EP can confirm its amendments, 
CM has no veto power: budget 
adopted 
EP does not decide 
 
 
Joint text adopted  Joint text adopted  New draft 
EP rejects the joint 
text 
 
 
New draft New draft New draft 
 
 
 
 
 
Assuming complete and perfect information and rational behaviour of both actors, the budgetary 
process incorporates the incentive for them to adopt the joint text. We observe first that for the 
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Parliament confirming its own amendments is better than asking for a new draft budget: thus, the 
strategy “adopt” is dominant with respect to “not decide”. It is not possible a priori to decide 
whether having the joint text approved is better for the Parliament than having a new draft. 
However, rejection of the budget has always been a rare event even in the turbulent 1980s15. 
Besides, the possibility that the Parliament confirms its amendments in case it approves the joint 
text, while the Council rejects it, gives the strategy “EP adopts” a dominance over rejection.  
The Council is indifferent between the strategies “to adopt” and “not to  decide”, while it 
certainly fears to reject the joint text, in case the Parliament approves it and confirms its 
amendments. Thus, the strategy “to reject” is dominated by the strategies “to adopt” and “not to 
decide”. Now the matrix for dominant strategies looks as in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Dominant strategies for Council of Ministers (CM) and European Parliament (EP) after the 
Conciliation Committee 
 
 
 CM adopts the 
joint text 
CM does not 
decide 
EP adopts the joint 
text 
Joint text adopted 
 
Joint text adopted 
 
 
 
Thus, in the final stage, the Parliament and the Council will endorse the text decided by the 
Conciliation Committee, as the IGC Presidency wished. Assuming that the players act strategically 
and using backward induction, the Conciliation agreement is also the actual game equilibrium of the 
budgetary codecision (Napel and Widgrén, 2006). 
                                                          
15 The rejection of the 1980 budget was due to lack of agreement on the agricultural expenditures and to the cut in non 
compulsory expenditures made by the Council. The 1985 budget was rejected because of the devices employed by the 
Council to hide the insufficient budgetary resources. The 1982 rectification budget was rejected because the Parliament 
did not approved the solution adopted by the Council to the UK rebate problem. 
 22
 
5. Conclusion 
Decision-making procedures for the EU finances reflect the division of power inside the EU and 
show the dominance of a veto players system: the balance of power in the financial decisions is 
currently clearly in favour of the Council of Ministers and of the European Council, both governed 
by intergovernmental procedures, as the main ceilings on revenues and expenditures are decided 
through negotiation among the member States, excluding an effective agenda-setter role for the 
Commission and an effective veto power for the European Parliament. In particular, the 
introduction of the Financial Perspectives, which have eased the budgetary process and solved 
many inter-institutional controversies, have also concentrated the budgetary conflicts in the year 
when the financial programming is decided, have introduced rigidity in the expenditures for a rather 
long period of time and have modified the decision-makers with respect to the Treaty’s 
prescriptions. This same perspective has been confirmed by the new Constitution. A conservative 
solution and the confirmation of the unanimity requirement in the Council, has prevailed for the 
adoption of the Financial Perspectives, while only a passerelle towards qualified majority has been 
provided for: the Parliament’s consent does not imply a real departure from inter-governmentalism, 
while the disappearance of the Interinstitutional Agreement deprives all EU institutions of a device 
whose voluntary nature has proved successful in sustaining repeated cooperation.  
The full prerogatives of the member States have been confirmed also in the Own Resources 
decision, where the current system of veto players has been thoroughly restated: the Commission 
has not been upgraded to an agenda-setter role, the Parliament has not even been required to give its 
consent and no passerelle for the introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council has been 
provided for.  
The annual budgetary process has been marked instead by the upgrading of the Parliament as 
a joint decision-maker. The role of the Parliament has been confirmed by the Constitution’s new 
budgetary procedure which introduced a slightly different version of Amsterdam legislative 
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Codecision. As in legislative Codecision, the Conciliation Committee is the final stage and if it does 
not reach an agreement, the budget draft is rejected and the Commission prepares a new draft. 
However, an explicit set of incentives has been provided to support the adoption of the Committee’s 
joint text: 1) if one or both institutions fail to decide, the joint text is approved; 2) the Parliament 
may confirm its amendments if it approves the joint text while the Council rejects it and no 
symmetric punishment holds for the Parliament, not even in the form of granting a veto power to 
the Council. These provisions should guarantee that the budget is adopted, if not in earlier stages, at 
least in the version negotiated in the Conciliation Committee. 
The paper does not investigate the potential outcomes of the bargaining within the 
Conciliation Committee, which depend on the hypothesis about the real distribution of power 
between the Parliament and the Council. Assuming symmetric bicameral bargaining, “we cannot be 
precise about where, on the Council-Parliament contract curve, [the budget] will be passed, because 
there are no institutional constraints on bargaining in the Conciliation Committee. Using any of the 
standard models (Nash, Rubinstein or Baron and Ferejohn) one might expect outcomes to split the 
difference (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001, p. 372)”. Napel and Widgrén (2006), however, argue that the 
formal symmetry between the Parliament and the Council in the Conciliation Committee is not 
sufficient to make them equally powerful co-legislators and that asymmetries in their respective 
voting rules make the  Council a more critical player. 
The Constitutional revision of the budget process and of the decision-making process for the 
Financial Perspectives reveal a tendency in the EU towards rationalization and “consolidation of the 
rules which have been necessitated by practical constraints outside the Treaty machinery” 
(European Convention, 2003b, p.12). This implies the institutionalization of the negotiation fora 
(interinstitutional agreements, trialogues, conciliation meetings,…) which have up to now proved so 
useful in sustaining repeated interactions: however, it is questionable whether bargaining devices 
and formally detailed procedures are equally effective in channelling inter-institutional conflict into 
cooperation.  
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Appendix  
Figure 1.  The current budgetary procedure 
 
    COMMISSION: preliminary draft budget X0 
 
CM adopts budget draft : X1 
 
 
                                                           
             EP  
 
                                                                                                                         
                                         
            NR                 A  E 
                                           Budget adopted: X1 
        
   
     Modifies CE X2 Amends NCE 
     AM  votes  AM  members 
 
 
 
   Increase in  No 
   total   increase in 
   expenditure  total expenditure 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                            
CM 
 
 
        
       A           modification                   R    modification          A               NR                   E                         
                                 rejected  or                              accepted                                              
       no decision                              or no decision                 
                                                                     
         
Budget  
adopted: X2 
 
                                                                            X3                                                                                                                           X3 
                            EP 
                                                                
                            E or R     
                  M members, 3/5 votes      
                      Budget adopted:  
                         X2  on NCE                                          
                        X3 on CE 
       AM members, 2/3 votes                                                                  
 New draft                                                       R          A               NR                  
                                      
                                                                                                                  Budget adopted:  X3 
 
 
 
Legenda. A: approve; AM: absolute majority; CM: Council of Ministers; E: amend; EP: European Parliament; NR: not 
react; R: reject; Xi: version i of the budget draft. Note: CM votes by qualified majority unless specified. 
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Figure 2.  The budgetary procedure in the Convention’s draft 
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                                               CM: X1      
                                                          
 
                                                              
 
   EP 
      
 
       NR     A  E: X2 
                                                    X1  adopted 
                     If CM adopts all EP’s amendments  
 
 CONCILIATION COMMITTEE               
       
         
X2 adopted 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                         
     Agreement: X3    No agreement 
                     
 
                                                                                                                                                          
                          EP                                                          CM                    R 
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R                       A                                A                                                            majority  members, 3/5 votes 
  majority members,     majority  votes      
 3/5  votes                    
                  
                                               X3 adopted                                X2 adopted                  
       
    new draft  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legenda. A: approve; AM: absolute majority; CM: Council of Ministers; E: amend; EP: European Parliament; NR: not 
react; R: reject; Xi: version i of the budget draft.  
Note: CM votes by qualified majority unless specified. 
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Figure 3.  The Budgetary procedure in the Constitution  
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Legenda. A: approve; AM: absolute majority; CM: Council of Ministers; E: amend; EP: European Parliament; NR: not 
react; R: reject; Xi: version i of the budget draft.  
Note: CM votes by qualified majority unless specified. 
 CM approves the 
joint text 
CM does not 
decide 
CM 
rejects 
the joint 
text 
EP approves the 
joint text 
X3 adopted X3 adopted  
EP does not decide X3 adopted X3 adopted New draft 
EP rejects the joint 
text 
New draft New draft  New draft 
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